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Indian Space Research Organisation PSLV-C60/SPADEX Mission

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Later today (see countdown), ISRO will launch Pits #PSLV-C60/SPADEX Mission. SPAce Docking EXperiment (SPADEX) dual spacecrafts.

The mission objective is to test in-orbit rendezvous​ and docking. Primary payloads are two separate spacecraft, each of about 200+kg, a chaser and a target. The PSLV will place them in two different orbits, and 10 days later, the chaser will adjust its orbit, approach and dock with the target. Control of the combined spacecraft, power transfer between them, and subsequent undocking procedures are also part of the mission.

In addition, ISRO continues to exploit the 4th stage as the PSLV Orbital Experiment Platform (POEM) at around 350km altitude. The POEM will host 24 experiments, 10 of which are non-governmental – academic institutions or private sector startups. The POEM and hosted payloads have a lifetime of a few months, but the SPADEX mission​ is expected to operate for two years.

See the countdown here. The launch will be streamed on Youtube live here.

For more details, the ISRO subreddit is an excellent source.

PSLV-C60: SpaDeX Mission Updates and Discussion.
byu/Ohsin inISRO

Chandrayaan-3: India’s Foothold on the Moon

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A version of this article first appeared on Spacewatch.Global in June 2024

A Political Imperative

On Friday, 23rd August 2023, moments after confirming the successful soft landing of the Vikram lander with the words “we are on the Moon,” ISRO Chairman Somnath invited Indian Prime Minister Modi to speak. Unlike September 2019, during the unsuccessful Chandrayaan-2 lander mission, Modi was not in Bangalore but in South Africa, attending a BRICS meeting. This mission, a product of national political and financial commitment, attracted international acclaim. 

With one eye on the vast national and international audience and the other on the upcoming general election in 2024, the Prime Minister spoke for ten minutes. Politics and politicians play a more critical role in facilitating space missions than the scientists and engineers who realise them. When Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin took humanity’s first steps on another world, they received a live telephone call from President Nixon from the White House, which they shared live on TV around the world. Whereas Apollo 11’s success was a goal set in response to the USSR’s spectacular success in placing the first human in Earth orbit on 12th April 1961, India’s Chandrayaan-3 success was in response to its regional competitor, China.

India’s first official announcement to go to the Moon came on 15th August 2003. This announcement was not driven by the urge for scientific exploration but more likely a response to China’s announcement in January of the same year that they would launch a mission to the Moon. Ultimately, India reached the Moon on 8th November 2008 with Chandrayaan-1, a year after Chang’e 1, the first Chinese lunar mission, arrived in lunar orbit on 5th November 2007. Reflecting the geopolitical rivalry of the USA and USSR during the Cold War, India and China continue that silent rivalry today. China has achieved several remarkable successes in space (human spaceflight, landing a rover on Mars, lunar sample return, and now a continuously inhabited space station). With its larger economy and centralised political structure, China has rapidly grown in its space capabilities, now second only to the USA. The gap between India and China is exemplified by one metric: In 2023, ISRO missed breaking its all-time high of seven launches in one year, whereas China achieved a new high of 67.

It is not only international politics that influence how ISRO operates but national politics as well. The ISRO website uses English and Hindi, but individual centres may prefer a local language. For over a decade, India has had an Official Language Implementation Committee promoting using Hindi as an official language across all ISRO centres. This remains a challenge given that surprisingly large populations across India do not speak Hindi. As in medicine, science, and information technology, English is the world’s default language for the space industry.

The success of Chandrayaan-3 has demonstrated ISRO’s technological competence and is likely to secure the two key ingredients to accelerate India’s space program: increased political and financial commitment. Propelled by Chandrayaan-3’s success and motivated by China’s ongoing achievements, India will pursue more ambitious space missions. India’s delayed human spaceflight program is on target for the first flight of an Indian astronaut on board an Indian launch vehicle from India by 2025. Motivated by this success, India will likely announce missions for a lunar sample return, Martian rover, Venus orbiter, and exoplanet hunter, and develop more powerful and reusable launch vehicles.

Lessons from Chandraayan-2

Credit: ISRO

Chandrayaan-2, weighing almost 4 tons, was launched in July 2019 using a new LVM-3 rocket. It arrived in lunar orbit on 20th August, and the lander separated on 2nd September; however, the landing attempt was unsuccessful. The Chandrayaan-2 orbiter is now five years into its planned 7.5-year operational life, returning the highest resolution images of the lunar surface among the seven operational spacecraft currently in lunar orbit. Images for identifying potential landing sites for the Chandrayaan-3 lander came from the Chandrayaan-2 orbiter. Whilst the Chandrayaan-3 lander communicated directly with Earth during descent and on the surface, the Chandrayaan-2 orbiter served as a redundant communication relay for the lander in 2019. The Chandrayaan-3 orbiter, which ISRO refers to as the Propulsion Module, did not have this relay capability.

The Chandrayaan-2 Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) findings highlighted concerns with the inadequacy of data on the spacecraft’s attitude, altitude, and velocities during the powered descent. The report pointed to the need for (i) a larger landing target and finer engine thrust controls and (ii) more precise and frequent data on horizontal and vertical velocities, as well as altitude during the powered descent. Chandrayaan-3 would need to know, with higher precision, its location, altitude, and attitude at all times during the powered descent phase. Recommendations included more efficient hazard-avoiding algorithms with built-in redundancy, especially during the fine braking, hovering, and final touchdown phases. As a result, Chandrayaan-3 became ISRO’s spacecraft with the most built-in redundancy to date. The additional instruments which facilitated these recommendations included laser and radio frequency-based altimeters, laser Doppler and horizontal camera velocimeters, laser gyro-based inertial referencing, and accelerometers. The fifth non-throttleable engine in Chandrayaan-2 was removed altogether, reducing the dust kicked up at landing. The four throttleable engines were reconfigured to allow changes of thrust in increments of 10% rather than 20%. The attitude correction rate was also enhanced from 10°/s for Chandrayaan-2 to 25°/s for Chandrayaan-3.

With so many modifications, ISRO planned and conducted a series of experiments to test the new configuration. An Indian Air Force helicopter supported an Integrated Cold Test where navigation sensors were flown over an ISRO-created lunar landscape in the Chitradurga district, about 300 km northwest of Bangalore. India’s vast launch centre at Sriharikota was used to conduct an Integrated Hot Test, which involved the lander hanging from a crane to test propulsion, navigation, guidance, and the updated flight software. Despite the numerous simulations and physical testing, the space environment, which includes near vacuum, extreme variations in temperature, and one-sixth gravity in the vicinity of the Moon, cannot be duplicated on Earth.

The lander mass was increased to 1,726 kg (from Chandrayaan-2 lander’s 1,471 kg), most of this was in fuel. The additional fuel would allow for longer hover periods to avoid hazards and identify the most optimal landing target. The landing zone also increased from 500 m by 500 m to 2,400 m by 4,000 m. In February 2019, a landing simulation for the Chandrayaan-2 lander resulted in some damage to the lander’s legs. As an additional contingency, Chandrayaan-3 lander legs were reinforced to support the eventuality of a harder landing, which also increased the lander’s mass. A series of lander drop tests were conducted to ensure a safe landing with a vertical speed of up to 2 m/s, a horizontal speed of up to 5 m/s, and landing on a slope of up to 12 degrees. Other subtle changes included increasing battery capacity, data transmission capacity during powered descent, solar cells, and enhancing reaction wheels.

ISRO chose to meet the commercial request from OneWeb to launch its satellite in October 2022 and again in March 2023. In the absence of this delay, Chandrayaan-3 would have been launched much earlier. With multiple hardware and software enhancements and rigorous testing, almost three years later, ISRO, with greater confidence, launched Chandrayaan-3 on 14th July 2023.

What Next

Lunar landers and rovers from the USA, USSR, and China survived the lunar night using a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). The first use of an RTG in space was an experimental navigation satellite placed into Earth orbit by the US Navy in 1961. It used 96 g of Plutonium 238 to demonstrate an alternative, independent power supply. The heat was converted to electricity to power onboard instruments and used for temperature control while the spacecraft was in the Earth’s shadow. During the early 1960s, solar cells had very low efficiency compared to today. International sanctions following India’s first nuclear test in 1974 restricted India’s access to nuclear materials, preventing it from developing RTG technology. Since 2016, India has become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and in 2023 signed the US-led Artemis Accords. Free of the restrictions of the past, India is now developing nuclear power sources for use in space.

As expected, neither Chandrayaan-3’s lander nor the rover survived the ultra-low temperature of a lunar night. The mission ended less than two weeks after the touchdown. Prior to launch, the rover was tested to a temperature of -145°C, but since it could only communicate with Earth via the lander, it is impossible to say if it survived the lunar night.

India is now working on both a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) and a technologically simpler device based on a radioisotope source, a Radioisotope Heater Unit (RHU). The RHUs are incapable of providing electricity—only heat. They are used in environments other than space, including geographically remote locations on Earth (oceans, polar regions, unattended lighthouses, autonomous vehicles). ISRO tested its first RHU in the Chandrayaan-3 Propulsion Module, and RTG technology will likely follow. ISRO is expected to test a 5W RHU in a Technology Demonstrator Satellite.

ISRO has not formally announced the next mission to the Moon, but it is probably a sample return. This is not only because it follows in the footsteps of the Chinese Lunar Sample Return but also because for any space agency to grow, it must evolve. The scientists and engineers at ISRO will have enjoyed the success of the Chandrayaan-3 lander but will need to add to their experience by taking on the technologically ambitious challenge of sample return. Currently, the early design phase is likely to involve two launches. The first launch will include a Propulsion Module to get to the Moon, a Descent Module for the lunar landing, and an Ascent Module to take the samples back up to lunar orbit. The second launch vehicle, probably a GSLV Mk-2, will carry another propulsion module to the Moon and back and a Transfer Module that will dock with the ascent module in lunar orbit, transfer the samples, and return to Earth for re-entry. Where on Earth it will land has not been finalised. Perhaps mainland India, the Indian Ocean, or the Australian Outback.

Credit: ISRO

Long-term and sustainable exploration and exploitation of the Moon have become a geopolitical target for many nations in this and the coming decade. Just as in the 17th century, European countries competed with each other to acquire new lands in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, and in Antarctica in the 20th century, so today, countries worried about being left behind are committing political and financial resources to establish a foothold on the Moon. A base on the Moon will also be a stepping stone to exploring Mars and beyond. The two countries with concrete plans for sending humans to the Moon are China and the USA. India has stated that it wants to send people to the Moon. It has joined the US-led Artemis Accords instead of partnering with the Chinese and Russian program called the International Lunar Research Programme. Apart from the potential for an Indian astronaut to visit the International Space Station, these new partnerships might provide India with access to the technologies it needs to accelerate and fulfil its growing lunar ambitions.

India to build a Space Station – Bharatiya Antariksha Station

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Credit: Office of the Prime minister of India

On October 17th 2023, the Indian Prime Minister voiced India’s intentions to build a space station by 2035 and to send the first Indian crewed flight to the Moon by 2040. The formal announcement by the Press Bureau of India (text below) followed an in-person presentation to the Prime Minister by the ISRO chairman – S Somanath. The intention to establish an Indian space station was first announced in 2019 by the then ISRO chairman, K Sivan. Although this announcement is more formal and official, it is not much more than a press release. As significant as this public political undertaking, coming from the office of the prime minister is, there is no formal commitment of the funding to go with it. Yet. This is not unusual. India does not always employ a formal, structured long-term approach, like that for example of China’s rolling five-year plans. India’s journey towards a space station and eventually crewed flight to the surface of the Moon may be a little erratic and may even include a few cul-de-sac, it will get there.

The objectives and target dates for grand national programmes, for example USA’s Apollo programme of the 1960s, are usually determined by geopolitical rivalries. Then it was the USSR then but now it is the rapid growth of China’s space programme that motivated the USA’s Artemis to return to the Moon by 2025. The impetus for India’s date for the “first Indian to the Moon by 2040” is also China which has its target date for its first crewed mission to the lunar surface by 2030. In practice I suspect India will push that 1940 date to 1947 – the centenary of Indian independence.

The prime minister’s decision came on the back of the success of the lunar Chandrayaan-3 mission and the many-years-delayed launch of India’s first solar observatory, Aditya-L1. ISRO is also expected to undertake an uncrewed in-flight abort test on 21st of October 2021 of its crew module. This is one of the several tests towards India’s first crewed flight, known as the Gaganyaan mission. Targeted for 2025, the Gaganyaan mission will take a crew (nominally of three – but I will reckon it will be two) on probably a 24 hour flight to low Earth orbit.

The announcement, unhelpfully refers to a the HLVM-3 – the human rated LVM-3. This is unfortunate and so soon after ISRO, earlier this year, appeared to have settled on a naming convention of LVM-3 instead of of GSLV-3.

Prime Minister reviews readiness of Gaganyaan Mission

Indian Space Station to be set up by 2035

India to send Man to Moon by 2040

India to undertake missions to Venus and Mars
Posted On: 17 OCT 2023 1:53PM by PIB Delhi
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi chaired a high-level meeting to assess progress of India’s Gaganyaan Mission and to outline the future of India’s space exploration endeavours.

The Department of Space presented a comprehensive overview of the Gaganyaan Mission, including various technologies developed so far such as human-rated launch vehicles and system qualification. It was noted that around 20 major tests, including 3 uncrewed missions of the Human Rated Launch Vehicle (HLVM3) are planned. First demonstration flight of the Crew Escape System Test Vehicle is scheduled on 21 October. The meeting evaluated the mission’s readiness, affirming its launch in 2025.

Building on the success of the Indian space initiatives, including the recent Chandrayan-3  and Aditya L1 Missions, Prime Minister directed that India should now aim for new and ambitious goals, including setting up ‘Bharatiya Antariksha Station’ (Indian Space Station) by 2035 and sending first Indian to the Moon by 2040.

To realize this Vision, the Department of Space will develop a roadmap for Moon exploration. This will encompass a series of Chandrayaan missions, the development of a Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV), construction of a new launch pad, setting up human-centric Laboratories and associated technologies.

Why India signed the USA’s Artemis Accords and why now?

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First published in the Autumn 2023 edition of Room. Space Journal of Asgardia.

Updated 23rd September 2023 – Astrotalkuk.org Read full text online below or download pdf here.

During India’s Prime Minister Modi’s 4-day visit to the USA from 20th to 24th June 2023, India signed the Artemis Accords. Why did India do that, what was in it for the USA and why did it happen then?

The Artemis Accords is a non-binding bilateral agreement (thus not international law) between the USA (NASA and the USA State Department) and each nation that signs up. It specifies 10 principles, ostensibly consistent with the United Nation’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), for international cooperation in the civil exploration of the Moon, Mars, Comets and Asteroids. It was announced on 13th October 2020 during the 71st International Astronautical Congress in Dubai. The initial number of 10 countries (Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States) has gradually grown since. On 22nd June 2023, India made it to 27 countries. Since then Argentina and Germany have signed bringing the total to 29.

Why did India sign when it did? The technologies for commercial exploitation of resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies is now sufficiently mature that every nation that can is rushing headlong to get their stake in the ground. The Moon has a very large deposits of many commercially sought after materials substances for example Helium-3 and Lithium. The technology to mine, refine and transport back to Earth is not yet present. But when it arrives, those nations with a presence on the Moon will be ready.

Indian Ambassador Taranjit Sandhu, signs the Artemis Accords on 21 June, 2023. US Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for India, Nancy Jackson (left), NASA Administrator Bill Nelson, and ISRO Space Counsellor, Krunal Joshi.

The number of missions beyond Earth’s orbit, especially to the lunar surface is expected to dramatically increase in this decade. Out of the six lunar landings scheduled in 2023, so far Japan’s (Hakuto-R) failed in April, Russia’s Luna 25 was lost in August. India succeeded with its first soft landing with Chandrayaan-3 on 23rd August 2023. Another from Japan (SLIM), and two NASA commissioned, private sector missions (Nova-C IM-1 and Peregrine) could land before the end of 2023.

As more companies and countries gain a foothold on the Moon, they will benefit from an agreed set of common rules. That is where the Accords come in. The Accords require all countries that sign to abide by a number of principles when operating in space beyond the Earth. The 10 principles include:

1. Peaceful uses: cooperative activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes and in accordance with international law.

2. Transparency: commit to broad dissemination of information regarding their national policies and exploration plans. Agree to share scientific information with the public on a good-faith basis consistent with Article XI of the OST.

3. Interoperability: agree to develop infrastructure to common standards for space hardware and operating procedures that include fuel storage, landing systems, communication, power and docking systems.

4. Emergency Assistance: commit to offering all reasonable efforts to render assistance and comply with the rescue and return agreement as outlined in the OST.

5. Registration of Objects: agree to register and publicly establish which space objects, (on the surface, in orbit or in space) are owned and operated by who.

6: Release of Scientific data: commit to openly sharing scientific data arising from space exploration missions. Not mandatory for private-sector operations.

7. Preserving Outer Space Heritage: undertake to ensure new activities help preserve and do not undermine space heritage sites of historical significance.

8. Space Resources: signatories affirm that extraction of resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the OST.

9. Deconfliction of Space Activities: undertake exploration with due consideration to the UN guidelines for the long-term sustainability of Outer Space Activities as adopted by United Nations Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 2019. Activities, where potential harmful interference could occur, should be restricted to pre-identified Safety Zones. The size, location and nature of operations in a Safety Zone should be notified to all signatories and the UN Secretary-General.

10 Orbital Debris: signatories agree to limit harmful debris in orbit through mission planning that includes selecting flight orbital profiles that minimise conjunction risk, minimising debris release during the operational phase, timely passivation and end-of-life disposal.

The current and next decade will see multiple nations arriving at the Moon, near-Earth asteroids and comets for space exploration and commercial exploitation. The accords define a set of guidelines, principles, and a set of common norms and behaviours that are mutually beneficial when operating missions far from Earth. But why not simply sign up for the United Nations Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty? Whilst the Outer Space Treaty, established in 1967 has 113 signatories, The Moon Treaty (1979), only 18 parties have agreed to be bound by it. India is one of those 18 but has not yet ratified.

Why have so few nations signed up to the Moon Treaty? All to do with the legal status of extracting resources from the Moon. Article I of the OST describes outer space which includes the Moon and other celestial objects as being the “province of all mankind” and “is not subject to national appropriation”. Further, article II in the Moon Treaty explicitly forbids any part of the Moon from becoming the property of a nation, a private organisation or a person. Countries don’t sign up to the OST because they consider it will restrict their future potential commercial operations in space and especially on the lunar surface. The Artemis Accords, on the face of it, offer a workaround. All member nations affirm that extraction of resources “does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the OST.” In other words, you can extract and own the resources but have no claim of ownership of the place from which they came. How legally robust that is, only time will tell. The Artemis Accords (now with 29) already has more signatories than the Moon Treaty (with 18).

But there is another reason why nations may join the Artemis Accords. As the name suggests, The Artemis Accord signatories get to join the already International “Artemis Programme”. What that actually means will depend on the capability each nation can bring to the table. Even a small nation, new entrants like Romania and Rwanda with minimal capability will have access to and opportunities for cooperation. A key benefit of any club membership is access to other members of that club.

Why has India joined only now? Artemis Accords has a competitor. Less than a year after the Artemis Accords were announced, China and Russia established the International Lunar Research Station. The ILRS is a lunar base designed for conducting scientific research. It includes all the support facilities on the lunar surface, in lunar orbit and transport between Earth and the Moon. Two years on, only four nations have joined (Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Venezuela) China and Russia.

India has always remained non-aligned. It has kept its options opened and lipped between USSR, Europe or the USA – wherever its interests were best served at the time. A lesson learnt during the international sanctions regime following India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. India’s first rocket launched into space in 1963 came from the USA. Its first satellite and first astronaut went to Earth orbit on USSR launch vehicles. India used the Space Shuttle to launch one of its communication satellites in 1983, collaborated with NASA on its first Moon mission in 2007 and is preparing to launch a joint ISRO/NASA Earth observation in 2023. ISRO has launched European satellites and engaged the European Ariane 5 to launch its heavy GEO satellites. Over the last 5 years, Russia has been assisting ISRO with its Gaganyaan (Human Spaceflight) programme.

Sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine have severely diminished its ability to collaborate in space. Right now and in the foreseeable future, India sees more opportunities with the USA than with Russia.

The geopolitical and economic landscape of mid-2023 was just right for the USA to invite India and India to accept. It was in USA’s interest to get India onboard. It is a win-win situation. As a result, India will have access to technology and know-how for its upcoming high priority Human Spaceflight Programme, Gaganyaan. For the USA, India joining is a huge boost for the Accords which will motivate more countries to join the Accords rather than the ILRS. Setting the Accords on the road to becoming the de facto standard.

The principles of the Accords are said to be “grounded” in the OST and the Moon Agreement, but the Accords is not a United Nations product but has its origins in the USA State Department and NASA. If and when France and Italy sign-up, the Accords will become the default go-to framework for international collaboration in space. In the process, pretty much side-lined the ILRS. A geopolitical win for the USA.

Recognising the importance of India signing the accords, India extracted significant concessions that included space and non-space-related benefits. Although diplomatic ambiguity obscures any direct connection to the significant concessions.

Additional USA-India agreements announced at the same time include :

a NASA/ISRO joint mission to the ISS in 2024 (this tight timeline may not be met but more immediately this may ‘facilitate” NASA support for India’s Gaganyaan programme)

 support India’s membership of the Mineral Security Partnership

establish a joint Indo-US mechanism between industry, government and academia for artificial intelligence, information science and quantum information.

A new public-private cooperation forum for the development of advanced communication using 5G and 6G.

A multimillion-dollar investment to establish a semiconductor ecosystem which will include semiconductor assembly and test facilities in India.

In addition to collaborative activities in space, and bilateral economic opportunities, perhaps the most significant concession was the 4 days state visit by India’s prime minister to the USA and the opportunity to address a joint meeting of the US Congress. A public endorsement from the president of the most powerful democracy to the prime minister of the largest one. Particularly useful for a prime minister looking to win a 3rd term in elections in India in 2024. In return, the USA, through India’s membership, boosted the future success of the Artemis Accords and the Artemis Programme.

However, the Artemis Accords are not legally binding. It is not a treaty or an agreement but a set of Accords. There is no compliance or enforcement mechanism. Despite it being a product with roots in one country, currently, it is the only framework that can offer practical value and tangible benefits to all nations with space missions beyond the Earth.

In the USA, the Wolf Amendment legally restricts how NASA can collaborate with Chinese Space missions. Whilst the Wolf Amendment does not legally prohibit China from signing the Accords, in practice that is the effective outcome. Over the last decade, China checked off some astonishing accomplishments in space. Highly successful human space programme, a space station in Earth orbit, a Lunar rover on the far side of the Moon and a soft landing of a rover on the surface of Mars. China sees the Artemis Accords as an instrument to sustain US dominance whilst undermining China’s space ambitions. All this whilst Russia’s space programme has experienced a significant decline resulting from the sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine. Russia may be associated with the heady days of Sputnik and Gagarin but now China has surpassed Russia and is second only to the USA. Whilst the Wolf Amendment remains, it is unlikely in the short term that China will join and thus prevent the Artemis Accords from being adopted as a near-global framework for responsible behaviours in space.

Just as in Star Trek, the Khitomer Accords of 2293 were followed by the Second Khitomer Accords in 2375. So as the Artemis Accords attain wider engagement, they will evolve over time too.

That the Artemis Accords is a product of one country, the USA is its major drawback. To succeed in its ambition to be a global “common set of principles to govern the exploration and use of space” the Artemis Accords require an internationally inclusive appeal. In a decade or two when the Artemis programme exists only in the rear-view mirror of space history, the Artemis Accords could finally become the global governance framework for all nations exploring and exploiting space beyond Earth orbit. The content could remain substantially unchanged but politically transformed with a new name and placed under the auspices of the United Nations.